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There are no hopeless situations;
there are only men who have grown hopeless about them.
Clare Boothe Luce
Fifteen years of civil war and foreign military intervention in Leba-
non has resulted in a terrible loss of human life, many casualties, and
massive physical destruction.' Lebanon is a country occupied by two
states, Syria2 and Israel,3 and victimized by two revolutions.' Israel and
Syria are antagonists who limit the violence of their confrontation to
Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Palestinian and Iranian revolutions have fo-
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Washington College of Law, The American University. The
author wishes to express her gratitude to Professors Claudio M. Grossman and
Nicholas N. Kittrie for their invaluable advice and encouragement.
1. Ben-Meir, Lebanon: A Human Rights Tragedy, Christian Sci, Monitor, May 11,
1989, at 19. See T. FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT To JERUSAL.EM (1989) (providing an
updated journalistic analysis of Middle East politics). Since its independence in 1943,
Lebanon has endured recurring strife between its Sunni and Shiite Muslim, Druze,
Maronite Christian, and Greek Orthodox factions. See generally K, SAuBI, CROSS-
ROADS TO CIVIL VAR: LEBANON 1958-76 (1976) (discussing the pre-war period and
the first two years of the civil war itself); E. KOURY, THE CRISIS IN THE LEBANESE
SYSTEM: CONFESSIONALISM AND CHAOS (1976) (analyzing the fundamental weaknesses
within the Lebanese political system); Zogby, To Silence Lebanon's Guns, Christian
Sci. Monitor, June 29, 1989, at 19 (analyzing the prospects for reconciling the various
Lebanese factions).
2. Pakradouni, Four Dimensions of the Lebanese Presidential Election, 6 MIDDLE
E. INSIGHT 34 (1988). The Syrian army, which consists of 40,000 troops, occupies 65%
of Lebanon. Boustany and Murphy, Syria Signed Secret Pledge on Pullout From Leb-
anon, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1990, at A30.
3. Pakradouni, supra note 2, at 35. Israel occupies 15% of southern Lebanon with
a force of 1,500-3,000 troops. Id. This Israeli-declared "security zone" also contains
200,000 of Israel's 2.7 million population. Diehl, Israel Seems Ready to Linger in S.
Lebanon, Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1989, at A33. See Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupa-
tion: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 60 (1990)
(stating that Israel has not established a formal military-administrative system in Leb-
anon as it has in the Israeli-occupied territories).
4. Pakradouni, supra note 2, at 34-35. Approximately 10,000-15,000 Palestinians
occupy refugee camps in Beirut, the mountains, the south, and the Bekaa. Id. The
Iranian "Revolutionary Guards" consist of 1,500-2,000 men who live in and maintain
training camps and bases in the Bekaa, the southern suburb of Beirut, and the south of
Lebanon. Id. at 35.
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cused on Lebanon as a "launching pad" for achieving their aims.5 Leb-
anon's territory is currently divided among these external forces.
Until September 1988, Lebanon had, in accordance with its constitu-
tion, held regular elections and changed governments in a peaceful
fashion.' Today, President Elias Hrawi's government, established in
November 1989 in accordance with the Taif Accord,7 is presiding over
increasing chaos. The fact that various militias have acquired a vested
interest in perpetuating a divided Lebanon has exacerbated this situa-
tion." While the Lebanese crisis has an internal dimension-the frac-
5. Boustany and Murphy, Lebanon Battles Demonstrate Syria-Iran Rivalry, Wash.
Post, Jan. 7, 1990, at A18.
6. H. COBBAN, THE MAKING OF MODERN LEBANON 9-10 (1985). On September
23, 1988, President Amin Gemayel appointed a military cabinet, headed by Maronite
General Michel Aoun, to rule Lebanon. Aoun assumed the position of prime minister
after the Lebanese Parliament failed to choose a successor for the president on the last
day of his six-year term. Military Cabinet Named in Lebanon, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23,
1988, at A8. The Lebanese Constitution enables the president to appoint prime minis-
ters and allows the cabinet to carry out the president's functions if the president is for
some reason unable to perform those functions. LEB. CONST. art. 53. See Jureidini,
Lebanon: The Consuming Conflict, The Elusive Consensus, 6 MIDDLE E. INSIGHT 21,
23 (1989) (describing the events which led to the failure to identify the "real" govern-
ment of Lebanon). The three Muslim officers of the six man interim government
named by Gemayel boycotted the decision because tradition reserved the premiership
for a Sunni Muslim. Boustany, Two Rival Governments Claim to Rule in Lebanon,
Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1988, at Al. The Shia house speaker, Hussein Husseini, main-
tained that Gemayel's declaration of a provisional government had been in "violation of
Lebanon's constitutional tradition and national covenants" and was "illegitimate." Id.
Lebanon had two governments, one operating in Christian East Beirut led by General
Michel Aoun and the other in Muslim-dominated West Beirut led by Selim Hoss. Id.
The cabinet has not functioned since 1985 and the General Assembly has not con-
ducted elections since 1972. Id.
In March 1989, violent clashes erupted in Beirut between Christian and Muslim
forces when General Aoun's Christian forces opened fire on Syrian positions on the
Damascus-Beirut highway. Mark, Lebanon: The Current Crisis, Cong. Res, Serv.,
Mar. 21, 1990 at 5. At that time, General Aoun declared a "war of liberation" to drive
the 40,000 Syrian troops out of Lebanon. Id. In response to General Aoun's crusade to
expel Syrian troops from Lebanon, Syria continuously dumped shells and high-caliber
projectiles on the Christian area of Lebanon. Boustany, A Harsh New Look For an
Old War, Wash. Post, Apr. 12, 1989, at A17. Between March and September 1989,
civilian casualties rose to 800 dead and over 4,500 wounded before the Arab league-
sponsored cease-fire stopped the fighting. Lebanese Holds Talks on Unity, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 15, 1989, at A6. Additionally, the majority of the 1.5 million inhabitants of Bei-
rut fled the city. Boustany, Fierce Shelling in Beirut Deadens City, Wash. Post, Aug.
13, 1989, at A26. See McLaurin, Lebanon: The Promise and Pitfalls of Reform, 6
MIDDLE E. INSIGHT 19 (1989) (critically assessing the results of General Aoun's liber-
ation campaign).
7. Lebanese National Accord Document, F.B.I.S.-NES-204, Oct. 24, 1989 [herein-
after Taif Accord].
8. See T. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 234-35 (stating that the various militias prQf-
ited from the breakdown of Lebanese authority by using their military power to control
the sources of distribution for various goods and services).
THE TAIF ACCORD
tious nature of the Lebanese political systemR-the external dimensions
of the crisis are the most important and the most pressing; foreign mili-
taries have occupied Lebanon and foreign nations have interfered in
Lebanese internal political affairs. It is critical to Lebanon's future po-
litical stability that foreign nations refrain from intervention in Leba-
non's domestic affairs.
Part I of this Comment presents a general history of the Lebanese
crisis and explains the initial involvement of Syrian and Israeli military
forces and the Palestinian and Iranian revolutionary components. Part
II analyzes how regional efforts to resolve Lebanon's crisis through the
Taif Accord (the Accord) were destined to fail from the outset because
the Accord contradicted Lebanon's political realities and failed to sub-
stantiate Lebanon's sovereignty. Part III suggests legal and political
remedies available to the international community which could help
Lebanon regain its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political
independence.
I. THE LEBANESE CONFLICT
A. PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO
The presence of foreign nationals in Lebanon played an important
role in sparking the critical problems that country has faced from 1967
9. E. KOURY, supra note 1, at 59. Although a Lebanese republic was established
under French mandate in 1920, it did not gain independence until November 22, 1943.
W. Fisher, Lebanon, in THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, 1989, at 587 (1988).
In 1943 the Christian and Muslim factions set about to resolve the difficulties of
achieving political harmony among themselves. Id. The majority of the Muslims sought
a union with Syria and the Arab world, while the majority of Christians desired a
French alliance. Id. The unwritten National Pact of 1943 established a compromise
whereby the Christians would not rely on the West and the Muslims would not seek to
incorporate Lebanon into Greater Syria. Jureidini, supra note 6, at 23. Under the
terms of this unwritten agreement, the three highest positions in the Lebanese govern-
ment, president, speaker of the house, and prime minister, went to the Christian
Maronites, Shiite Muslims, and Sunni Muslims respectively. Keegan, Shedding Light
on Lebanon, ATLANTIC, Apr. 1984, at 43, 51. The Druze were given the post of chief of
staff (but not commander) of the army. Id. This unwritten agreement, which placed
Maronites and Sunni Muslims in top governmental posts, was based on a 1932 popula-
tion census. Hudson, The Breakdown of Democracy in Lebanon, 38 J. INT'L AFti. 277,
281 (1985). By the early 1970s, the Christians no longer formed a majority within the
country. Id. at 281. A recent United States government study indicates that the Shiite
Muslims comprise 41% of the population, followed by the Sunni Muslims at 27% and
the Maronites at 16 %. UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WHO'S WHO
IN LEBANON (1989), cited in Mark, supra note 6, at 3.
Many Lebanese experts point out that almost all of the seventeen sects that occupy
Lebanon today seek assurances that political reforms will not hinder them or give ad-
vantages to one at the expense of the others. E. SALEM, PROSPECTS FOR A NEv LEBA-
NON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE SPECIAL ANALYSES 10 (1982).
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to the present. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon, which began in
1948,10 expanded dramatically as a result of the Arab armies' defeat in
the 1967 Six Day War.' Additionally, Jordan's expulsion of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1970 augmented the armed Pal-
estinian presence upon Lebanese soil.
12
In November 1969, at a meeting sponsored by Arab leaders, the su-
preme commander of the Lebanese army and a PLO delegation signed
the Cairo Agreement in order to regulate the PLO's presence and ac-
tivities in Lebanon.13 By accepting the Cairo Agreement, Lebanon le-
gitimated the PLO, granted it control over the Palestinian refugee
camps in Lebanon, and enabled the PLO guerrillas to attack Israel
from a closer position.' 4 Lebanon became the only base for direct at-
tacks upon Israel available to the Palestinians.'5 The numerous refugee
camps in southern Lebanon enabled the PLO to recruit and train Pal-
estinian guerrillas to raid Israel from Lebanon.'
The Palestinian resistance had severe consequences for Lebanon. For
example, the large Palestinian population enhanced the power of the
Muslims which led to tension between Lebanon and Israel.' 7 The Pales-
tinians also received support from the Palestinian refugee camps, which
led to strained relations with Palestine's Maronite neighbors and the
Lebanese government.'
8
Israel intended its ensuing retaliatory attacks upon Lebanon to turn
the Lebanese against the Palestinians and to destroy the Palestinians'
10. I. RABINOVICH, THE WAR FOR LEBANON 1970-85, at 40 (1985). Approxi-
mately 180,000 displaced Palestinians fled to Lebanon during the Arab-Israeli war of
1948-49. Id.
11. Id. The defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War
led the Arab World to support the emerging Palestinian resistance movement, espe-
cially in Lebanon. Id.
12. Id. at 41.
13. Id. The agreement had three chief components: 1) it prohibited the establish-
ment of Palestinian refugee camps near towns; 2) it prohibited military training in
these camps; and 3) it precluded PLO guerrillas from attacking Israel from within
Lebanon. Fisher, supra note 9, at 591.
14. Viorst, A Reporter at Large: The Christian Enclave, NEW YORKER, Oct. 3,
1988, at 40, 49; see H. COBBAN, supra note 6, at 212-13 (stating that "a weak, deli-
cately balanced government" in Beirut prevented the Lebanese from effectively dealing
with the Palestinian-Israeli crisis); see also K. SALIBI, supra note 1, at 42-43 (asserting
that Lebanon was forced, under duress from certain Muslim factions and the Arab
nations, to accept this agreement in order to keep peace within its own borders).
15. Viorst, supra note 14, at 42.
16. A. El-Gemayel, Public International Law in Lebanon, in THE LEBANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM 445, 452-53) (A. E1-Gemayel ed. 1985).
17. W. KHALIDI, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN LEBANON: CONFRONTATION IN THE




capacity to attack Israel.19 Nevertheless, solidarity between the Pales-
tinian resistance and the Lebanese Arab-Muslim nationalists grew, 0
encouraging many Muslims to feel morally obligated to provide a home
for the Palestinians." The Israeli attacks, consequently, further eroded
the effectiveness of Lebanon's political institutions. 2 For example, in
the spring of 1973, the Lebanese army failed to prevent the Palestinian
organizations from violent reaction to Israel's raid on PLO targets and
leaders in Beirut.2
Throughout 1974 and early 1975, PLO guerrillas continued to attack
Israel. 4 Israel retaliated by conducting air raids and incursions into
Lebanon.2 5 In the spring of 1975, the Lebanese political system col-
lapsed under the weight of rival internal and external forces such as the
PLO and Israel.26
B. SYRIA
Syrian troops, with troops from other Arab countries, entered the
Lebanese conflict under the guise of a peacekeeping force. 7 The Syrian
troops have remained in Lebanon; Syria's President Assad ultimately
19. Hudson, supra note 9, at 279.
20. Id.
21. I. RABINOVICH, supra note 10, at 42.
22. See Hudson, supra note 9, at 283 (discussing the political problems Lebanon
faced as a result of growing factions in the country).
23. I. RABINOVICH, supra note 10, at 43. The Lebanese army ended its blockade
of Palestinian bases when Syria, an ally of the PLO, closed its Lebanese borders, cut-
ting off Lebanon from Arab economic trade. Id. A new Lebanese-Palestinian agree-
ment, the Malkert Accord, failed to ease Lebanese-Palestinian tensions. Id. On May
21, 1987, the Lebanese National Assembly voted to abrogate the 1969 Cairo agree-
ment, which "defined and regulated the activities and legitimized (the PLO's) presence
in Lebanon." Fisher, supra note 9, at 598-99. The abrogation meant that the Lebanese
government would no longer sanction PLO operations in Lebanon. Id.
24. Fisher, supra note 9, at 591.
25. Id.
26. W. KHALrDi, supra note 17, at 47. The incident that ignited the Lebanese Civil
War occurred at Ain Rummaneh, a Christian suburb of Beirut, on April 13, 1975. Id.
"Unknown assailants fired at a Sunday church gathering attended by Pierre Gemayel,
leader of the Maronite Phalanges, killing his bodyguard and two others. Maronite mili-
tiamen in blind retaliation ambushed a bus passing through the neighborhood a short
while later, massacring the 28 passengers (mostly Palestinians) on board." Id. After-
wards, inter-communal fighting between Christians and Muslims spread. Keegan,
supra note 9, at 54.
27. Fisher, supra note 9, at 592.
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seeks hegemony over Lebanon. 28 The Syrian government does not ac-
knowledge the sovereignty of Lebanon. 9
By May 1976, Syria had become more active in Lebanese affairs,
with about 40,000 Syrian-controlled troops stationed in Lebanon.30 On
June 1, 1976, Syria invaded Lebanon, ostensibly to end the civil war
and restore peace, but actually to crush the Palestinians.31 Fearing that
the crisis would expand to involve other countries, the Arab League 2
called an emergency meeting of the Arab Foreign ministers.3 3 The min-
isters agreed to send a "Symbolical Arab Security Force"34 to Leba-
non, coordinating the Force's arrival with a gradual withdrawal of Syr-
ian troops.3 5 Although the agreement purported to include troops from
six different Arab states and the PLO, 500 Syrians and 500 Libyans
composed the one thousand man force.3 8 Because this peace-keeping
force failed to restore peace, the fighting continued unchecked until
28. See Kirkpatrick, Whisper No More About Syria, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 1986, at
B7 (arguing that Assad has worked for a decade to establish Syrian control of
Lebanon).
29. See Nader, An Exclusive Interview with Abdul Halim Khaddam, 3 MIDDLE E.
INSiGHT 6, 7 (1983) (maintaining that Lebanon and Syria are "one Arab nation").
30. Fisher, supra note 9, at 592.
31. Keegan, supra note 9, at 55; Fisher, supra note 9, at 592. According to one
account:
The invasion of Lebanon was a military failure. Both in Mount Lebanon and in
urban areas of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon, the Palestinians and Lebanese left
were able to inflict heavy casualties on the Syrian forces, who were ill prepared
for the nature of the terrain and the ferocity of the opposition. An invasion cal-
culated to put a swift end to an embarrassing political situation thus served in
fact to aggravate it.
I. RABINOVICH, supra note 10, at 55.
32. See generally SALAFY, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES: ROLE AND OBJECTIvEs 4
(1988) (stating that the Arab League is an association of Arab states designed to be "a
voluntary instrument for cooperation and coordination"). The Arab League "has no
executive or mandatory powers or authority.., and is fully dependent upon coopera-
tion of the member-states." Id.
The stated principles and goals of the League include:
protection of the independence of the member-states; protection of the peace and
security of the region; cooperation between the League and other international
organizations; accomplishment of Arab political cooperation; cooperation and co-
ordination in the social, cultural and economic arenas; dedication to national in-
dependence movements and removal of European colonialism in the region ...
Achievement of Palestinian independence through Arab and international sup-
port and activity has been, and remains, a principle goal of Arab League efforts.
Id. at 4-5.
33. Fisher, supra note 9, at 592.
34. See The Syrian Forces in Lebanon (January 28, 1989) [hereinafter Syrian
Forces] (available at the Lebanese Embassy, Washington, D.C.) (describing the estab-
lishment of the "Symbolical Arab Security Force").




October 1976, when Arab states negotiated an end to the Lebanese
civil war at summit meetings in Riyad and Cairo. 37
The Riyad and Cairo summit meetings resulted in an agreement
among the six nations to establish a 30,000 member Arab Deterrent
Force.38 Composed primarily of Syrian troops, this deterrent force
would maintain peace and stability in Lebanon.30 The Force's stated
mission40 was first, to implement the Cairo Agreement by overseeing
the withdrawal of Palestinian forces from the north to the south of
Lebanon; second, to ensure that all armed forces returned to the loca-
tions they occupied before April 1975; and third, to place all heavy
weaponry under the control of the Arab Deterrent Force 41 The Deter-
rent Force successfully achieved its mission; all but one of the involved
Arab countries withdrew its troops.4 2 Syrian troops have remained in
Lebanon and continue to expand in number.4 3
C. ISRAEL
The Arab Deterrent Force's suppression of the Lebanese civil war
heightened Israel's fears for the security of its own northern border. 4
The PLO's relocation to the south changed the situation in southern
Lebanon, which remained untouched by the civil war that was fought
in Lebanon's central and northern regions." In 1977 and 1978, Israel
focused on curtailing the PLO's presence in southern Lebanon.4
Despite Israel's defensive actions along the Lebanese border, the
PLO successfully attacked Israel on some occasions.47 For instance, in
March 1978, a Palestinian squad, which originated in Lebanon, at-
tacked a bus full of passengers in Tel Aviv, inflicting heavy casualties. 8
To retaliate by destroying the PLO's military strength south of the
37. I. RABINOVICH, supra note 10, at 55-56.
38. Id. at 56.
39. Id.
40. See ZIMBLER, Peacekeeping Without the U.N.: The Multinational Force In
Lebanon, 10 YALE J. Ir'L L. 222, 223 n.7 (1984) (stating that the Arab League"presumably argued that it acted under Article 52 of its Charter, which allows regional
organizations to preserve or restore 'international peace and security' in all 'appropri-
ate' situations").
41. Resolution Adopted by the Limited Arab Conference, Riyadh, Oct. 18, 1976,
reprinted in W. KHALIDI, supra note 17, at 197-99.
42. Gasser, Internationalized Non-International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of
Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 Ami. U.L. REv. 145, 156 (1983).
43. Kirkpatrick, supra note 28.
44. I. RABiNOVICH, supra note 10, at 109.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 107.
47. Id.
48. Fisher, supra note 9, at 592.
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Litani River, Israeli forces advanced into southern Lebanon later that
month, causing numerous casualties and substantial destruction.4  The
United Nations Security Council demanded that Israel withdraw. The
Security Council then established a six thousand member United Na-
tions Interim Force in Lebanon ("UNIFIL")50 in order to oversee and
patrol the Israeli withdrawal5' and to maintain peace in the area.5 2 Is-
raeli forces withdrew from southern Lebanon in June 1978 but contin-
ued to support a renegade Christian Lebanese militia headed by Major
Saad Haddad.53
In June 1982, Israel conducted a second, full-scale invasion of Leba-
non in order to eliminate the PLO bases in southern Lebanon.54 Israel
cited the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador in London
by the renegade Palestinian organization of Abu Nidal as a justifica-
tion for this invasion.55 The Israelis, however, sought to secure their
northern border5" by taking conclusive military action which would de-
feat the Syrians and expel the Palestinians from Lebanon.5 7 "Operation
49. I. RABINOVICH, supra note 10, at 107; Fisher, supra note 9, at 592.
50. See Rule, U.N. Peacekeeping Forces Named Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1988, at Al (describing the role of the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon).
51. S.C. Res. 425, 33 U.N. SCOR (2074th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (1978).
52. Fisher, supra note 9, at 592.
53. Id. at 592. Despite the presence of Haddad's militia and the UNIFIL, the PLO
conducted sporadic raids on northern Israel. Keegan, supra note 9, at 58. Major Had-
dad and the Israelis rejected the Lebanese government's attempts to reestablish a regu-
lar Lebanese army presence in southern Lebanon because they maintained that the
army not only lacked the ability to control the area, but also operated under Syrian
control. I. RABINOVICH, supra note 10, at 112. The Lebanese government took discipli-
nary actions against Haddad and deprived him of his Lebanese army salary in Febru-
ary 1979. Id.
54. Hudson, supra note 9, at 287.
55. Id. Months before the invasion, the American news media reported an impend-
ing Israeli invasion of Lebanon to eliminate the PLO. Id. The attempted assassination
of the Israeli ambassador supposedly led to American approval of the invasion. Id.
56. See T. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 130-31 (stating that the collective opinion in
Israel was that the PLO had amassed too much weaponry in southern Lebanon and
had shelled northern Israel numerous times through the years).
57. I. RABINOVICH, supra note 10, at 122. The goals of the Israeli operation were
summarized under four headings:
(a) destroying the PLO military infrastructure in southern Lebanon
and the creating of a security zone of some forty kilometers, the
effective range of the PLO's artillery and rocket launchers; (b) de-
stroying the PLO's position in the rest of Lebanon, particularly in
Beirut, to eliminate its hold on the Lebanese political system and to
diminish its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict; (c) defeating the Syrian
army in Lebanon to effect its full or partial withdrawal from that
country and to preempt the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli war; (d)
thereby facilitating the reconstruction of the Lebanese state and po-
[VOL. 6:57
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Peace for Gallilee," which was opposed by the Lebanese government,"8
brought 120,000 Israeli soldiers as far as Beirut to battle the PLO.""
PLO and Israeli troops clashed for control of West Beirut while 10,000
PLO and 30,000 Syrian and Arab League troops defended their posi-
tions in northeast Lebanon.6 0 The Israelis shelled and destroyed many
Lebanese towns and villages.61
The United Nations Security Council passed resolutions condemning
this Israeli operation and requesting withdrawal of Israeli troops.02 The
operation succeeded in temporarily driving the PLO from Lebanon.63
The Israeli Defense Forces, however, were unable to drive the Syrian
Army out of Lebanon."
On May 17, 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement under
the sponsorship of the United States8 in which Israel agreed to with-
draw its troops from Lebanese territory. 66 Lebanese President Gemayel
later abrogated this agreement in return for guarantees of internal se-
curity from President Assad of Syria. 67 On January 14, 1985, the Is-
raeli Cabinet voted to completely withdraw its troops from Lebanon.6 8
Although the Israel Defense Force officially withdrew from Lebanon in
1985, its soldiers have continued to control 325 square miles in south-
ern Lebanon. 9
litical system under the hegemony of Israel's allies - [Lebanese pres-
ident] Bashir Jumayyil and the Lebanese Front.
Id.
58. Hudson, supra note 9, at 287.
59. Zimbler, supra note 40, at 237.
60. Id.
61. Fisher, supra note 9, at 593. According to newspaper reports, civilian casualties
among both Lebanese and Palestinians were great-about 14,000 people, at least 8070
of them civilians, were killed during the first two weeks of the war. Id.
62. S.C. Res. 508, 37 U.N. SCOR (2374th mtg.), U.N. Doe. S/RES/508 (1982);
S.C. Res. 509, 37 U.N. SCOR (2375th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/509 (1982). See
Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. Cm. L. REV.
113, 123 (1986) (stating that a condemnation of illegality by an international body
such as the United Nations, even if not binding, has adverse political consequences for
the offender).
63. See Fisher, supra note 9, at 593 (noting that the PLO commitment to with-
draw from Beirut was negotiated by diplomats from the United States, and took place
in August 1982). But see SCHIFF AND YA'ARI, IsRAEL'S LEBANON WAR 306 (1984)
(stating that the senior contingents of the PLO emerged unscathed from the fighting,
thus freeing them to conduct possible future military activity at another location in
Lebanon).
64. ScmIF AND YA'ARI, supra note 63, at 307.
65. Fisher, supra note 9, at 593-94.
66. Id. at 594.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 596.
69. Diehl, supra note 3, at A33.
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D. THE IRANIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON
The rise of a revolutionary Islamic regime in Iran that was deter-
mined to "export" the Islamic revolution to Lebanon was another fac-
tor that affected the Lebanese crisis. ° Iran is a Shia7 ' country, and has
"traditionally influenced" the Lebanese Shia. Iran introduced the
radical Shiite Hezbollah or "Party of God" into the complicated Leba-
nese situation. Hezbollah, which advocates the establishment of an Is-
lamic republic in Lebanon, was founded in 1982 in Baalbek, Lebanon's
Bekaa Valley, by Iran-educated Shiite clergymen.7 3 The Iranian Revo-
lutionary Guards, the Pasdaran, who received directives and financial
assistance from Tehran through the Iranian embassy in Damascus, 74
provided military support to Hezbollah 5
Syria eventually used Amal78 forces against the Iranian-backed
Hezbollah, because Syria viewed Hezbollah as interfering with its own
plans to annex Lebanon. Amal focused its attacks against Hezbollah
bases in southern Lebanon.7 8 On May 5, 1988, Amal and Hezbollah
militias fought in the southern suburbs of Beirut .7  The Iranian and
Syrian governments were unsuccessful in attempting to impose a cease-
fire.80 On May 27, 1988, Syria deployed several hundred troops to the
70. I. RABINOVICH, supra note 10, at 95.
71. See W. KHALIDI, supra note 17, at 25 (explaining that the name "Shia" comes
from the sect's origin as Shiah or partisans of Ali, who was the first cousin of the
Prophet Mohammed). After the Sunnis, the Shiites are the second largest sect in Is-
lam. Id.
72. I. RABINOVICH, supra note 10, at 95-96
73. T. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 505.
74. Id. Seventeen American citizens were abducted in Lebanon between July 19,
1982 and February 17, 1988. Id. Hezbollah carried out most of these kidnappings. Id.
The American and Lebanese intelligence communities have ascertained that the Ira-
nian Revolutionary Guards "not only have enormous influence over the Hezbollah kid-
nappers but have also ordered specific abductions for their own foreign policy pur-
poses." Id.; see Kramer, Hezbollah Held Hostage, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1989, at A19
(stating that Hezbollah has held the hostages as a bargaining chip to obtain the release
of Shiite prisoners in Middle Eastern and Western jails).
75. T. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 505.
76. See Norton, Lebanon: Conflict Without End?, 6 MIDDLE E. INSIGHT 44 (1988)
(explaining that Amal is the populist reform movement that showed indications in the
early 1980s of becoming the representative for the Lebanese Shia Moslems).
77. Fisher, supra note 9, at 599; see also Pakradouni, supra note 2, at 35 (asserting
that Iran is attempting to dominate Lebanon in order to gain control of the Arab East).
But see Muir, Lebanon Senses Change in Tehran, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 26,
1989, at 3 (stating that because of the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini, Tehran is no
longer trying to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon).
78. Fisher, supra note 9, at 597.




southern suburbs of Beirut.8' Ultimately, Amal and Hezbollah with-
drew their military operations from most of the southern suburbs.
82
II. THE TAIF ACCORD AND THE REAL
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. REGIONAL EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE CURRENT CRISIS THROUGH
THE TAIF ACCORD
The Taif Accord superficially addresses, but does not resolve, the
root problems behind Lebanon's continuing ordeal-the reallocation of
power among Lebanon's competing sects and the foreign military occu-
pation of Lebanon. On July 31, 1989, the three member Arab League
Mediation Committee, composed of the President of Algeria, the King
of Saudi Arabia, and the King of Morocco, proposed that the National
Assembly convene in Riyad, Saudi Arabia, in order to enact constitu-
tional reforms, including a "balanced" legislature and executive and
"equal opportunity" for all Lebanese people.83 The Committee also
called for abolishing the militias and withdrawing Israeli forces.8
On September 26, 1989, the Committee arranged a cease-fire be-
tween the Syrian/Druze/Amal troops and the Lebanese Armed
Forces/Lebanese Forces soldiers.8 5 On September 30, 1989, sixty-two
members of the Lebanese Parliament met in Taif, Saudi Arabia, under
the sponsorship of the Arab League, to begin discussions of how to re-
solve the Lebanese problem through government reforms.86 Their dis-
cussions culminated in the creation of the Taif Accord.
B. CHANGES TO THE 1943 NATIONAL PACT
From the outset, the objective of the Lebanese Parliament was to
defuse tension and restore the constitutional process by holding a presi-
dential election.87 With the backing of the international community,88
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Mark, supra note 6, at 10.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. These 62 members were most of the surviving participants of the original 99
member National Assembly. W. Fisher, Lebanon, in THE MIDDLE EAST AND NoRTH
AFRIcA-1990, at 606 (1989). Their mandate had been continuously renewed since
1972, due to the impossibility of holding parliamentary elections in the midst of civil
war and foreign military intervention in Lebanon that had occurred over the past fif-
teen years. Id.
87. Boustany, Imprisoned in Luxury, Lebanon's Aging Legislators Try to End a
War, Wash. Post, Oct. 15, 1990, at A31.
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the Parliament sought to end General Aoun's declared "War of Libera-
tion" to free Lebanon from Syrian occupation.
On October 22, 1989, the Lebanese Parliament agreed to endorse a
charter of national reconciliation, providing for political reforms and
the restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty.89 The Taif Accord states that
the Chamber of Deputies (Parliament) will have 108 seats, (nine more
than in the previous system) divided equally between Christians and
Muslims. 90 The speaker of the chamber will hold the post for the life of
the parliament, rather than for one year, as under the former system. 1
The President will appoint the prime minister after consulting with the
speaker of the Parliament. 2 According to the Accord, within two years
the Lebanese and Syrian governments would decide on the redeploy-
ment of Syrian forces to Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.9
The National Assembly increased the power of the Sunni prime min-
ister by decreasing the power of the Maronite president.94 Apart from
the relatively inconsequential act of extending the term of the speaker
of the Parliament, a Shia,95 the assembly failed to address the needs of
the Shia 8 or the Druze97 According to some Lebanese experts, the
88. See Ibrahim, Lebanon's Slain Pact, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1989, at A10 (stat-
ing that the Taif Accord received the strongest support from the major powers, includ-
ing the United States, France, and the Soviet Union). France later appeared reluctant
to endorse the Taif Accord when faced with widespread opposition to the accord by the
Maronite Catholics. Ibrahim, French Reassert a Lebanese Role, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3,
1989, at A24 (late ed.). France's turnabout was augmented by two events: 1) the assas-
sination on November 22, 1989 of Rene Moawad, the president elected under the Taif
Accord, and 2) the replacement of Moawad with President Hrawi, a Syrian-backed
Lebanese Christian who publicly supported the use of force to remove General Aoun.
Id.
89. Mark, supra note 6, at 11. The Lebanese Parliament approved the Taif Accord
on November 5, 1989 at a meeting in al-Qualayat in northern Lebanon. Id.
90. Taif Accord, supra note 7, at II.A.6.
91. Id. at II.A.1.
92. Id. at II.A.6.
93. Id. at III.F.4.
94. Nader, The Politics of the Future in Lebanon, 7 MIDDLE E. INSIGHT 12
(1990). According to President Hrawi, the Accord transferred some of the previously
unexercised powers of the presidency to the Lebanese cabinet. Nader, An Exclusive
Interview with Lebanon's President Elias Hrawi, 7 MIDDLE E. INSIGHT 25, 30 (1990).
95. Taif Accord, supra note 7, at II.A.I.
96. Nader, supra note 94, at 12. In southern Lebanon, the pro-Syrian Shiite mili-
tia, Amal, prohibited Anwar Sabbah, a Shiite legislator who took part in the Taif nego-
tiations, from entering his hometown. Beirut Parliament Summoned to Meet, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 3, 1989, at A3. The Lebanese police reported that the militiamen acted
under the orders of Amal's leader, Nabih Berri, who has opposed the Taif Accord
because he believed it did not sufficiently increase Amal representation. Id.
97. See Kittrie, Friends of the Druze Cannot Lose, 3 MIDDLE E. INSIGHT 20, 21
(Aug./Oct. 1983) (stating that the Druze were originally a splinter group of the Is-
maili branch of Islam, who developed their own religio-political entity separate from
both Muslims and Christians).
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Shia who participated at Taif were not representative of today's Leba-
nese Shia community in that many of the deputies who participated no
longer live among the Shia. 8 The Shia are now the largest community
in the country and see no justification for continuing the dominant
Maronite-Sunni partnership."9
The Druze, who were essentially unrepresented at Taif, compose only
six percent of the Lebanese population, but Lebanese experts maintain
they are as critical to achieving peace in Lebanon.100 Like the majority
of communal sects in Lebanon, the Druze seek security and auton-
omy.101 Specifically, they seek a position in the Lebanese government
that equals their importance, not their numbers.
10 2
Generally, the Taif Accord does not substantiate Lebanon's sover-
eignty because it tends to perpetuate the Syrian presence indefi-
nitely.103 Although the agreement provides for the redeployment of
Syrian forces to the Bekaa Valley, 0 4 no provision exists for the even-
tual withdrawal of Syrian forces from all of Lebanon. °00 In discussions
with the Syrian Government, the United States has maintained that a
final resolution to the Lebanese conflict must include the withdrawal of
Syrian troops from Lebanon."'
98. Nader, supra note 94, at 12. The Shia "represent the past traditional leader-
ship of the community, which has lost its connection to the Shia community of today.
The Shia demand true democracy in a one-man, one-vote system." Id.
99. See Boustany and Murphy, supra note 5, at A18 (stating that Iranian leaders
oppose the Taif Accord because it does not give sufficient power to Shiite Muslims).
Although Shiite Muslims make up the Iranian government, Sunni Muslims make up
the Syrian government. Id.
100. Nader, supra note 94, at 12.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Taif Accord, supra note 7, at III.F.4 (stating that at the end of a two
year period the Lebanese and Syrian governments shall agree "to determine the
strength and duration of the presence of Syrian forces" in certain designated areas).
104. Id. at III.F.4.
105. Id. However, on January 12, 1990 the Washington Post reported that Syria
gave Saudi Arabia and other Arab states "an unpublicized written pledge" to negotiate
a complete withdrawal of its 40,000 troops from Lebanon. Boustany and Murphy,
supra note 2, at A30. Syrian foreign minister Farouk Charaa reportedly signed this
document in Damascus during a visit by Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal on Oct-
ober 20, 1989. Id. The United States State Department denied the existence of such an
agreement in a letter to United States Senator Robert Dole. Letter from Janet G.
Mullins, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, United States Department of
State, to Robert Dole, United States Senate (Apr. 1990). In a meeting with Senator
Dole, Syrian president Hafez Assad also denied the existence of this secret agreement.
Dole Meets With Assad, ATFL OUTLooK, Apr. 1990, at 4.
106. Murphy, Syria Expectant, U.S. Cautious on Improved Ties, Wash. Post, Apr.
29, 1990, at A24.
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C. THE TAIF ACCORD AND SEVERE INTER-CHRISTIAN WARFARE
General Aoun and his supporters sharply criticized the Taif Accord
because it does not give a definite date for the complete withdrawal of
Syrian troops from Lebanon.107 According to journalistic sources, Gen-
eral Aoun demanded guarantees of Syrian withdrawal. 10 8 General
Aoun's opponents, including those within his own Maronite community,
argued that once the Taif Accord was enacted, the general became "a
rebel without a cause." 1°9 The Taif Accord divided the Maronite sect
among General Aoun and his followers, supporters of the Taif Ac-
cord,110 and the reportedly noncommittal Lebanese Forces militia. 1
General Aoun's refusal to accept the new president or to leave the
presidential palace at Baabda led to warfare between Aoun's forces and
the Lebanese Forces Christian militia under Samir Geagea in the coun-
try's 300 square mile Christian enclave."12 On March 9, 1990, General
Aoun announced that his war with the Lebanese Forces was over and
suggested amending rather than abrogating the Taif Accord as a condi-
tion for future talks. 13 On July 11, 1990, President Hrawi announced
an initiative to reunite the city of Beirut under the command of the
Lebanese government army. 1 4
One could argue that the Arab League-sponsored Taif Accord was a
starting point for constructive change to the existing confessional sys-
tem. The Taif Accord adjusted the confessional proportions and offered
Lebanon an opportunity for more fundamental reforms. The Taif re-
forms, however, failed to fully address the significant demographic
changes that have occurred in Lebanon. Lebanon urgently needs far-
reaching reforms to address new political realities. Furthermore, the
107. Ibrahim, supra note 88, at A24.
108. Id.
109. Hijazi, Gen. Aoun Exercises the Power of Not Moving, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10,
1989, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3.
110. See Ibrahim, Lebanon's Christians Are Torn Over Peace, N.Y. Times, Nov.
12, 1989, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3 (stating that what remains of Lebanon's estab-
lishment, the members of the General Assembly, some leaders of the Maronite church,
and businessmen, all support the Taif Accord).
111. Hijazi, supra note 109.
112. Mark, supra note 6, at 11. Between January and April 1990, the inter-Chris-
tian fighting resulted in the deaths of 900 people, the wounding of 3,000, and the emi-
gration of 300,000. Hizizi, Lebanese Christians Ravaged, Now by Lebanese Christians,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1990, at Al.
113. Hijazi, Lebanese General Seeks Peace Talks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1990, at
A3.
114. Muir, Lebanon: Another Glimmer of Hope, MIDDLE E. INT'L, July 20, 1990,
at 5. General Aoun's army would be required under this initiative to join the Lebanese
government army under General Emile Lahhoud. Id.
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presence of foreign forces in Lebanon still threatens the future of Leba-
non and the region.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Lebanon as a sovereign nation is on the brink of extinction. Each
new round of inter-sect fighting creates new wounds, deepens divisions,
and complicates the restoration of Lebanon's unity. The loss of state-
hood would inevitably lead to the further destabilization of the Middle
East.115 Lebanon is enmeshed in international and regional politics,110
and its new government needs assistance from the superpowers, as well
as the regional powers, to solve its problems. The new government must
seek the restoration of Lebanon's territorial integrity through the with-
drawal of all foreign forces.
A. INCREASE THE ROLE OF SUPERPOWERS AND REGIONAL ENTITIES
THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
The United States must participate in a comprehensive process to
find a long-term solution to Lebanon's conflict. Because of the anarchy
in Lebanon, terrorist groups such as Hezbollah 17 have held United
States citizens hostage with impunity.11 8 By contrast, peace in Lebanon
would help end the use of Lebanon's territory for acts of terrorism,
hostage taking, and exportation of illegal drugs.110
115. Wayne, Arab League Prepares New Peace Proposal, Christian Sci. Monitor,
June 22, 1989, at 2. Foreign troops comprise about 60% of the approximately 110,000
combatants in Lebanon. Id. The internal conflict has turned Lebanon into the primary
Arab-Israeli battleground. Id.
116. SALEM, supra note 9, at 2; see also Hoagland, The World's Indifference,
Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1989, at C7 (asserting that Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians
maintain spheres of influence in Lebanon while other regional forces such as Iran and
Iraq use the country as a battleground for their own conflicts).
117. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing the activities of Hezbol-
lab); see also Clawson, Opportunities for the West in Syria's Economic Crisis, Wall
St. J., Aug. 9, 1989, at 10 (stating that Syria permits Palestinian, Kurdish, and Iranian
terrorists to operate training camps in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon such as the
Bekaa Valley).
118. See Interview with United States Senator George Mitchell, Senate Majority
Leader, This Week With David Brinkley, (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 6, 1989)
(transcript at 9) (asserting that the Lebanese situation must be solved in order to re-
solve the hostage crisis).
119. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 28 (asserting that Iranians in Lebanon have been
responsible for kidnappings, hostage-takings, threats and murders in the Syrian-con-
trolled Bekaa Valley); see also Haddad, Blood Brothers, 200 NEw REPuBuc 16 (May
8, 1989) (asserting that the Syrian government finances its military occupation of Leb-
anon by its drug enterprise in the Bekaa Valley).
. 1990]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The renewed fighting and heavy shelling that began in March
1989120 prompted the United States Senate to unanimously pass a reso-
lution calling on President Bush to support all efforts, including those
of the United Nations, to achieve a cease-fire, gain the withdrawal of
all foreign forces, and encourage a process of internal reconciliation
among the Lebanese parties.121
The United States also has played a constructive role in supporting
the Arab League process, 2 ' but cannot hope to succeed in resolving the
conflict by assisting on its own.'23 Any long-term solution requires par-
ticipation by the Soviet Union. 24
On May 11, 1989, in the most recent Soviet-American effort to help
find a solution in Lebanon, the two countries stated their support for
"the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Leba-
non." '125 According to the former Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, Richard Murphy, when the United States and the So-
viet Union cooperate with each other, as they did on the United Na-
tions Security Council in ending the Iran-Iraq War,126 they can make
120. Nasr, Lebanon: Not Crisis-as-Usual, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1989, at A27.
Fierce fighting occurred in mid-March 1989 when General Aoun sought to close illegal
ports south of Beirut run by Syrian-backed Moslem militias. Boustany, Lebanese
Agrees to Lift Blockade, Wash. Post, May 4, 1989, at A28. Syrian troops occupying
Lebanon and their local Muslim allies fought Aoun's Christian portion of the Lebanese
army and the Lebanese Forces Christian militia for control of the ports. Id. Aoun
agreed on May 3, 1988 to suspend the blockade at the request of the Council of Arab
Foreign Ministers. Id.
121. S. Res. 108, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. F7247 (1989).
122. Ibrahim, supra note 88.
123. See Muir, US Influence in Lebanon Wanes in Wake of Pullout, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Sept. 8, 1989, at 4 (stating that the abrupt evacuation from Lebanon of all
United States diplomatic staff on September 6 reduces United States diplomacy efforts
to resolve Lebanon's continuing crisis); see also Boustany, U.S. Shuts Down Embassy
in Beirut, Wash. Post, Sept. 7, 1989, at A31 (chronicling United States involvement in
Lebanon).
124. See Fuller, The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East: Pros-
pectsfor Cooperation, 6 MIDDLE E. INSIGHT 5 (1989) (asserting that the Soviets in-
creasingly have opposed Syrian efforts to dominate Lebanon and control the PLO, and
accordingly should reduce their support for the Syrian military); see also Wright,
Bridging Mistrust in the Mideast, Wash. Post, Apr. 29, 1990, at Dl (stating that for
almost a year, the Soviets have decreased foreign aid to the Middle East, forcing coun-
tries like Syria to turn to the United States and Europe for economic and political
support).
125. Joint Soviet-American Statement on Lebanon (May 11, 1989) (released by
Tass Soviet News Agency). Both countries publicly called for support of the Arab
League cease-fire and cooperation with its peacemaking efforts. Id.
126. S.C. Res. 598, 42 U.N. SCOR (2750th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/598 (1987).
The United Nations Security Council demanded that, "as a first step towards a negoti-
ated settlement, Iran and Iraq .. .observe an immediate cease-fire, discontinue all
military actions on land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the interna-
tionally recognized boundaries without delay." Id.
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progress toward peace.1217 Both superpowers need to view the Lebanese
conflict as one which warrants high level attention. 28
B. INCREASE THE OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
Assuming that the superpowers want to engage in this joint effort, 29
the United Nations Security Council provides the best forum for reach-
ing a comprehensive resolution that would preserve a unified Lebanon.
Such a resolution should address the following critical points: 1) The
need for a stable cease-fire between the Lebanese and the external
armed forces involved in the present fighting; 2) the reaffirmation of
Lebanon's sovereignty and independence through the implementation
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 425130 and the schedul-
ing of the withdrawal of Syrian forces; and 3) the expansion of the
United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon, with a mandate to facili-
tate the withdrawal of the foreign armed forces, the holding of elec-
tions and reconstitution of the Lebanese state. If the concerned parties
refuse to implement these resolutions, then the United Nations must
take appropriate measures. For example, the United Nations, under its
charter, can impose political sanctions, economic sanctions, and con-
demnation for nations not complying with the resolutions . 31
127. See Murphy, What Now in the Middle East?, 2 WORLD MONITOR, Feb.
1989, at 44 (asserting that for the first time in United Nations history, the Security
Council passed a mandatory resolution demanding the end to the ongoing Iran-Iraq
conflict).
128. Zogby, supra note 1 at 19; see also Fuller, The United States and the Soviet
Union in the Middle East: Prospects for Cooperation, 6 MIDDLE E. INsIGHT 6 (1989)
(maintaining that only Soviet cooperation with the United States and several Middle
Eastern countries can pressure Syria to alter its aggressive policies); Nader, Interview:
General'Michel Aoun of Lebanon, 6 MIDDLE E. INSIGHT 29, (1989) (arguing that the
superpowers cannot "parcel out" Lebanon as "consolation prizes for futuristic [Middle
East] solutions"); Feldman, Arab League Renews Call for Peace, Christian Si. Moni-
tor, Aug. 18, 1989, at 3 (stating that as an arms supplier to Syria, the Soviets could, if
they wish, put pressure on that country).
129. See Lewis, 1988 Was, at Long Last, the Year of the U.N., N.Y. Times, Jan.
1, 1989, at 2E (maintaining that the effectiveness of the United Nations is determined,
to a great extent, by the superpowers). The Soviet Union is now working with the
United States, through the United Nations, to resolve superpower conflicts and address
local conflicts. Id.
130. S.C. Res. 425, 33 U.N. SCOR (2074th mtg.), U.N. Doe. S/RES/425 (1978)
(calling upon Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory and setting up a United Na-
tions peace-keeping detachment in southern Lebanon). See Bouhabib, Lebanon. A Fuse
Instead of a Buffer, Wash. Post, July 13, 1986, at B2 (asserting that complete Israeli
withdrawal from southern Lebanon and full implementation of the UNIFIL mandate
will stabilize southern Lebanon).
131. Murphy, supra note 127, at 44.
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C. THE OBJECTIVE: TRANSFORM LEBANON INTO A NEUTRAL STATE
The objective should be to give Lebanon the international status of a
neutral state.' 32 This objective entails the rebuilding of a strong state
capable of excluding "destabilizing" external forces and addressing
long-term domestic issues.' 33 Otherwise, Lebanon will continue to be
the battleground for all the radical elements in the Middle East.
1 34
Any resolution of the conflict in. Lebanon, by necessity, depends on
the degree to which such a settlement guarantees Lebanon's sover-
eignty, unity, and independence. While outside parties can endorse
these goals, the Lebanese must play the principal role in guaranteeing
their realization by negotiating a new formula for government and na-
tional unity. As in the past, however, the Lebanese government must
also look to external powers for cooperation and assistance in neutraliz-
ing the forces that threaten internal destruction.1 38 Ultimately, peace
will come only through cooperation among the different factions within
Lebanon and with foreign nations accepting the principle of noninter-
vention in Lebanon's domestic affairs.
CONCLUSION
The community of nations should honor and implement the United
Nations Security Council resolutions calling for the departure of all
non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon. The international community is
bound by the United Nations Charter to help Lebanon reclaim its ter-
ritorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence within its internation-
ally recognized boundaries. Lebanon was a founding member of the
United Nations and, as such, has a right to the United Nation's respect
and assistance.
Only a multilateral effort, combining the influence of the superpow-
ers, the United Nations, and the Arab League, can effect a solution to
the Lebanese crisis. The alternative is the destruction of Lebanon as a
132. el-Khazen, Lebanon's Unfinished Wars: Gods in Politics, Men in Religion, 6
MIDDLE E. INSIGHT 56 (1988).
133. Id; see also Nader, supra note 94, at 15 (stating that the Taif Accord's lack
of provision for a permanent withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon's Bekaa Valley
could entangle Lebanon further with the Arab-Israeli dispute).
134. el-Khazen, supra note 132, at 56.
135. Fisher, supra note 9, at 589. During a brief period of civil unrest and violence
in 1958, the Lebanese Government accused the United Arab Republic of meddling in
Lebanese affairs. Id. About 10,000 troops were sent to the Beirut area after the presi-
dent of Lebanon requested the United States' help to maintain peace and security. Id.
A United Nations General Assembly resolution provided for the withdrawal of the
American troops. Id.
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country, with additional chaos and suffering as the result. The Leba-
nese people deserve the right to a non-violent future.
